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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
M
ovement backwards and forwards across borders for
work is often considered to be the primary form of
unauthorized movement in Southern Africa. In south-
ern Lesotho, a new and particularly dangerous form of
two-way cross-border movement has become
entrenched. This situation warrants the label “crisis”; a crisis which is
devastating parts of the countryside in both Lesotho and the northern
Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. 
Media and official attention has focused on the extreme violence
which accompanies cross-border stock raiding. This paper seeks to
understand the social and economic roots and impacts of cross-border
stock theft. Such an analysis is a vital first-step towards the resolution of
the conflict since it shows not only why the violence occurs but who
stands to benefit from its perpetuation. The analysis is also helpful to
understanding the extent to which the existence of an international
border is implicated in the cycle and counter-cycle of violence. This
paper concludes with an assessment of official reaction, or inaction, on
the crisis. 
The findings are based upon wide-ranging interviews with 147
respondents in 10 villages in southern Lesotho. A complementary study
is now recommended on the South African side of the border. The
stock theft epidemic is characterized by the following features:
• Although stock theft is not new to this border zone, it became
more widespread, organized and violent in the 1990s. Some 71%
of the Basotho stockowners reported having had stock stolen
since 1990, many more than once. Over 40% of non-
stockowners say they are without animals because of stock
theft.
• Since 1990, 85% of stockowners in the border villages have lost
animals to thieves as compared with 49% from non-border vil-
lages. Shepherds from border villages also report a higher rate of
victimisation (83%) than those further removed from the border
(50%).
• Most cattle and sheep are stolen from cattle posts where they
are guarded only by shepherds. Stock is also taken from village
kraals and, on occasion, whole villages have been attacked and
all the stock driven off. Villagers in all ten villages rate stock
theft as a serious problem. 
• Stock thieves come from within Lesotho as well as across the
border in South Africa. Basotho stock thieves also carry out
raids in South Africa and vice-versa. Gun use is widespread,
although South African raiders seem to have greater access to
arms.
• Much of the theft appears to be coordinated by well-organised
criminal gangs but reliable information on their composition
and organization is difficult to access. Criminal networks in
Lesotho and South Africa also cooperate to dispose of stolen
animals in the lowlands of Lesotho and as far afield as Port
Elizabeth, Durban and Welkom
• The upsurge in stock theft is clearly related to growing poverty
in the region. On both sides of the border, mine retrenchments
have hit hard, sending experienced miners home and denying
young men access to wage employment. Not only has this exac-
erbated household and community poverty, but it has provided
willing foot-soldiers for stock thieves. Stock raiding produces
further impoverishment, insecurity and suspicion, fuelling the
escalating cycle of theft and counter-theft.
• Though not itself in dispute or a source of conflict per se, the
Lesotho-South African border plays an essential role in the
organization and impact of stock theft. There are significant dif-
ferences in vulnerability and impact between villages close to
the border and those further inland:
• The international border leads to a distinctive pattern of stock
theft. In the simplest scenario, raiders from one side steal from
border villages on the other and vice-versa and drive the stock
back over the border. The situation becomes more problematic
when Basotho stock thieves use the border as a refuge, stealing
from Basotho and driving the animals across the border into
South Africa to sell or exchange with South African thieves. 
• Cross-border counter-raids to retrieve lost stock and revenge
attacks are also common on both sides of the border. South
African victims then target Basotho border villages for revenge
raids, resulting in great tension and friction between ordinary
Basotho and South Africans.
• The only Lesotho village reporting harmonious cross-border
relations borders a white South African farming area. However,
white border farmers are not aloof from the conflict. Lesotho
police and villagers are adamant that some white South African
farmers are implicated in cross-border theft.
• Stock raiding has major negative impacts on households, com-
munities and cross-border interaction. The impacts also extend
to the national economy. In Qacha’s Nek and Quthing districts,
production of wool and mohair has fallen significantly in the
last 5 years. Livestock holdings have dropped and the numbers
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of stockless households has increased. 
• Farmers are reluctant to invest in breeding cattle as households
debate the merits of getting rid of their cattle. One prominent
stock-owner recently lost M200,000 of stock. Stock theft has
also had a deleterious effect on agriculture, reducing the avail-
ability of oxen for ploughing fields.
No-one is immune from small-scale and organized raiding. Stock
theft, coupled with decreasing agricultural production and increasing
unemployment, deepens poverty and desperation. At the household and
community level, the research found the following:
• Nearly 90% of respondents state their household economies
have been negatively affected by stock theft. A household’s
entire wealth and livelihood can be wiped out in one attack.
• Escalating stock theft and related violence have profound social
consequences, bringing fear and insecurity to ordinary people.
People are abandoning their villages and migrating to town and
to South Africa to look for work.
• Community relations have become fraught with tension and sus-
picion. Nearly half of all stockowners interviewed suspect specif-
ic individuals within their own village are involved in the theft
of animals – acting either as informants or actual thieves.
Invariably it is the poor who are fingered and stigmatised.
• Communal cooperation such as livestock loaning for ploughing
and mafisa (sharing of products) is in steep decline, as are cul-
tural activities and celebrations which involve the slaughter of
animals.
• Cross-border cooperation, activities and initiatives have col-
lapsed and there is considerable animosity and hatred between
the communities on either side of the border. Even casual visit-
ing and shopping have all but ceased.
Prevention efforts have involved some cross-border cooperation
between villages to apprehend thieves and return cattle but these efforts
are sporadic and make little dent on the problem. They often also lead
to vicious reprisals from stock-theft syndicates. Vigilantism is on the rise
in the face of widespread perceptions that the police and the courts on
both sides of the border are either ineffectual or corrupt. 
This paper examines the inadequacies of the policing of the crisis,
highlighting the low rates of arrest and prosecution. The difficulties of
geography and inadequate resources which hamper effective policing are
highlighted. Only in areas where the army is stationed or soldiers patrol
the border has there been any marked decrease in theft.
The situation is bound to deteriorate further unless there is effective
national-level attention and intervention. The low-level civil war in
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the nearby Tsolo district of South Africa in 1997 was fuelled by a potent
mix of poverty, mine retrenchments and stock theft. This conflict could
well pale in comparison with the volatile situation building in the
southern Lesotho border zone. Here, the same combination of factors
are compounded by ethnic and national difference, and the strategic
manipulation of borders by stock thieves on both sides. 
Both governments need to recognize that this local crisis could esca-
late into a major conflagration and intervene to defuse the situation,
calm tensions and work towards effective policing and a political solu-
tion. Within Lesotho, the passage of a new Stock Theft Act promises
heavy penalties for the shadowy figures involved in organized raiding,
provided they can be caught. The institution of a national stock register
also seems a step in the right direction though its likely effectiveness is
debated. 
Both the Lesotho and South African governments should acknowl-
edge that a crisis situation exists and that this is a regional problem.
Only when national governments, working together with local stake-
holders, take the problem seriously and begin cooperating can workable
initiatives to halt this devastating social and economic plague be imple-
mented.




tock theft is endemic throughout Lesotho. However, the
mountainous areas, particularly those which border the
Eastern Cape (former Transkei), are especially hard hit. Stock
theft and stock theft-related violence have reduced the living
standards of an already impoverished populace, exacerbated
social divisions and resulted in widespread violence both within
Lesotho and across the border. Many villages have been abandoned and
internally displaced people struggle to survive.
Much of the official and media attention to the stock theft crisis has
focused on the violence, especially cross-border violence, that plagues
the region. This paper sets out, instead, to understand the social, eco-
nomic, political and environmental impacts of this crisis on the resi-
dents of southern Lesotho. The study concentrates on southern Lesotho
but there are many parallels with the former Transkei region of the
Eastern Cape. Poverty is worse in these areas; policing is made more dif-
ficult by the rugged terrain and poor infrastructure; and residents of
southern Lesotho and the equally impoverished Eastern Cape both
engage in cross-border raiding.
There is a long history of raiding along the southern border between
Lesotho and South Africa. But worsening economic conditions in this
region are almost certainly responsible for the recent upsurge in such
activities. The contraction of migrant mining opportunities for men due
to large-scale retrenchments, a drastic decrease in the employment of
foreign novices and an increase in the use of sub-contractors in the
South African mining industry have put thousands of households in a
precarious economic position.1
The underdevelopment of Lesotho’s domestic economy, which is
most acute in the mountain regions, severely limits the potential for
excess migrant labour to be absorbed. Stock theft further undermines
social and economic security in the region. The effect on local residents
is devastating. Numerous people have been killed and injured, many
villages have been abandoned, thousands of people have lost the ani-
mals which were their primary means of support and the agricultural
sector has been adversely affected. If no measures are taken by the gov-
ernments of Lesotho and South Africa this situation will almost certain-
ly further deteriorate. The worst violence seems to stem from cross-bor-
der conflicts, and the existence of an international border further com-
plicates matters.




he research for this study is based primarily on 146 inter-
views conducted using structured open and closed-ended
questionnaires in ten villages in Qacha’s Nek, Quthing,
Mohale’s Hoek, and Thaba Tseka districts over a ten week
period from March to May 1999. Six of these villages are
located within 15 kilometres of the South African border – five border
the Eastern Cape and one borders KwaZulu Natal. The border villages
were selected at random for roughly equal geographical dispersion
stretching from Sehlabathebe to Moyeni. Four interior villages were
chosen to enable a comparative assessment of whether distance from
the border impacts upon the severity and form of raiding.
In each village, we set out to interview the chief or representative of
the chief, nine stockowners, four non-stockowners and one shepherd
with as equal gender representation as possible. The vast majority of the
interviews were conducted in Sesotho by members of the research team.
In addition to interviews in the villages, police officers and officials,
Rural Development officials, Ministry of Agriculture officials in the
Departments of Range Management and Livestock Services, District
Secretaries and a representative from each of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the South African High Commission were interviewed. 
The interviews were designed to collect data on: (a) respondents’
household socio-economic situation; (b) the social, economic and envi-
ronmental consequences of stock theft at both the village and house-
hold level; (c) the differential impact of stock theft on villagers; specific
instances of stock theft; and individual and community efforts to
counter stock theft; (d) people’s ideas on who is involved in stock theft;
(e) people’s perceptions of, and experiences with, police and govern-
ment efforts to counter stock theft; (f) people’s perceptions of the
underlying causes of the stock theft crisis and their suggestions for solu-
tions. We tried to determine the total number of animals owned in each
village but this proved impossible because of the poor state of the stock
registers. 
The 146 interviewees comprised 87 stockowners, 38 non-stockown-
ers, 10 chiefs and 11 shepherds. About 37% of stockowners and 45% of
non-stockowners interviewed were female. Some 39% of stockowners
and 61% of non-stockowners stated that they are unemployed and 58%
of stockowners and non-stockowners claim their households have no
regular monthly income. Monthly incomes range from M0 – M3,000,
averaging M286 for stockowners and M81 for non-stockowners. The
largest portion of respondents engaged in any wage earning activity
were farmers who are therefore heavily dependent on livestock.
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Livestock ownership amongst our interviewees varied tremendously
(See Appendix).
THE DIMENSIONS OF STOCK THEFT
S
ome 71% of the stockowners we interviewed have had stock
stolen since 1990. Many have been victimised a number of
times. One man from a border village has lost stock to thieves
nine times in this period, including twice in 1999.2 Over 40%
of previous stockowners say they are currently without animals
because of stock theft (either all their animals have been stolen or most
were stolen and the remainder were sold to pre-empt further losses).
Thieves are opportunistic and the patterns of theft reflect livestock
owning trends. Cattle are stolen more frequently than other animals,
but this is almost certainly because more people own them. Sheep are
actually stolen in greater numbers but, again, this is probably a result of
the larger numbers of sheep owned (see Appendix). In 40% of the
thefts, cattle were stolen. Theft of sheep occurred in 30%, goats 13%,
horses 13%, and donkeys 4%. 
In the majority of cases, animals are stolen not from villages but
from cattle posts where they are guarded only by shepherds. However,
stock is also taken from village kraals and, on occasion, villages are
attacked and all the stock is driven off. There are seasonal variations
only for the two villages where cross-border accessibility is largely deter-
mined by the level of the Senqu River. These villages report that theft
is much worse when the river is low in the winter. All ten villages rate
stock theft as a serious problem. 
Location is a key factor in determining the extent and nature of vic-
timisation. Border villages are susceptible to South African raids which
are often conducted in daylight by large parties that capture all avail-
able stock. Villages close to the border typically find themselves in a dif-
ficult situation for they are targeted by both Basotho and South African
stock thieves. When the figures are disaggregated spatially, it is clear
that border villages suffer more than their counterparts in the interior. 
The chief of a village involved in an ongoing battle with South
African raiders reports his people have had stock stolen fifteen times in
the past twelve months.3 Since 1990, 85% of stockowners in the border
villages have lost animals to thieves as compared with 49% from non-
border villages. Shepherds from border villages also report a higher rate
of victimisation (83%) than those further removed from the border
(50%). And, while the use of guns by thieves is widespread, South
African raiders rely on force of arms and resort to violence more readily
than Basotho thieves. 
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Cross-border stock theft involves a high level of violence; five of the
six border villages report theft-related deaths and all have suffered
injuries.4 Official police statistics claim that in 1997/1998 in the whole
of Lesotho, only fourteen Basotho lost their lives and three were seri-
ously injured in stock theft-related incidents, while two South Africans
were killed and two seriously injured.5 Yet the police commanders of
Quthing and Qacha’s Nek state that stock theft is the leading cause of
murder in both districts. It is unclear whether deaths go unreported,
unrecorded or misrecorded, but it is evident that official figures are
incorrect.
Respondents mention that people in their villages suspected of theft
have either been killed or have gone missing in the Eastern Cape:
Some of the thieves from our village who went to
Matatiele to steal animals have just disappeared. We do not
know what happened to them – whether they were killed
or imprisoned... We never even bothered to ask because
they are thieves.6
Stockowners and non-stockowners alike fear what they perceive to
be increasing levels of violence – thieves do not differentiate between
those with animals and those without. In one village, respondents
report raiding parties which not only stole animals, but looted homes,
shot people, raped women and generally terrorised the villagers.
Shepherds experience the highest level of violent intimidation and
victimisation. Shepherds have been bound, severely beaten, threatened
with guns, castrated and even set alight. Most live in fear of death and
injury:
I was attacked by Mfengu [South Africans] at the cattle
post. They beat me and fastened my hands with a rope.
They took me to another cattle post and captured two
more shepherds. After a time, I managed to escape and
went to a neighbouring cattle post where the shepherds
untied me. All the animals were stolen and I went back to
the village to report. I am now afraid to go to the cattle
post because I might be attacked.7
Being a shepherd is like sitting on the edge of a cliff from
which you can fall when the wind blows. It is a terrible life.
I am always in danger especially these days when thieves
use guns.8
The threat has frightened many families from hiring out their sons as
shepherds to other stock-holders.
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There is a widespread belief that stock theft has not only increased
in recent years, but it has become more violent and organised.9 The
police commander of Quthing District noted:
We have had [stock theft] from time immemorial, but from
a flock of sheep or a herd of cattle you would choose one or
two and go in the night and take them leaving the rest
with the owner. But what we have seen happening of late
is these guys start shooting at your house and telling you to
come out if you want to die. Then they open the kraal and
take everything. From the cattle posts they take the herd-
boys and only release them after a long time so they cannot
raise the alarm. That is what you see happening today.10
The presence of the international border between Lesotho and
South Africa facilitates different stock theft patterns. In the simplest
cases, either Basotho from one village steal from another village in
Lesotho or South Africans steal from border villages in Lesotho. The
situation becomes more problematic when Basotho steal from Basotho
and drive the animals across the border into South Africa, either to sell
or exchange the animals with South African thieves or to drive the
stock back into Lesotho via an alternate route. In both cases South
Africans are often blamed and anti-South African feelings are height-
ened. 
In some cases, Basotho from further in the interior will cross the bor-
der into South Africa to steal animals; once again the wrong party is
often blamed as South African victims then target Basotho border vil-
lages for revenge raids. Attempts to reclaim stock that has been taken
to South Africa results in much friction between Basotho and South
Africans.
Some border villages find themselves in a Catch-22 situation. If they
ignore the Basotho stock thieves, they are targeted by South African
revenge raids; however, if they move against the Basotho thieves, they
become embroiled in conflicts with them. Of course, border villages also
participate in theft, primarily in South Africa where raids are justified as
retaliation and revenge. The only village that reported harmonious
cross-border relations borders a white South African farming area. 
Yet this does not mean that white border farmers are not embroiled
in the conflict. On the whole much more prosperous than their black
counterparts in Lesotho and the former Transkei, they have little incen-
tive to steal from their impoverished neighbours, and much to lose if
they precipitate a cycle of revenge raids. Yet, Lesotho police and villagers
are adamant that white South African farmers encourage cross border
theft by hiring thieves and buying stolen animals – ‘White farmers are
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responsible. One day I heard a man from Matatiele talking to his friend
saying he bought his truck with money coming from stock he had stolen
from Lesotho. He said that he had orders from white farmers.’11
Small-scale stock theft, whereby an individual or small group steals
one or two animals for consumption or a quick sale to a butchery, is also
very common. Butchers tend to ask the person selling the animal(s), ‘is
it burning?’ If the answer is yes the animal is slaughtered immediately
and any parts with identifying marks are disposed of. 
There are also large well-organised networks operating both in
Lesotho and South Africa that cooperate to dispose of stolen animals. A
villager from Thaba Tseka District explains:
It is organised. For example, there are maybe two thieves
from this village, five from the next village and one from
another village who work together. I cannot know exactly
how they organise themselves but they transport stock dur-
ing the night. Like what happened here last year – the peo-
ple from our neighbouring village found their animals in
Maseru.12
Stolen animals from the mountain districts are transported to
butcheries in the lowlands: ‘People from Leribe, Butha-Buthe and Berea
come straight to Sehonghong to load their trucks and vans with stolen
stock.’13 Criminal networks reportedly ship the stock as far afield as Port
Elizabeth, Durban and Welkom.14
Stock theft is a key element in a much larger illegal economy
involving arms trafficking and drug smuggling and is directly or indi-
rectly responsible for the majority of murders in Qacha’s Nek and
Quthing. Stock theft networks are part of a thriving criminal trade on
the Lesotho-South African border. Stolen animals are merely one form
of currency in this trade which also involves guns and dagga. Both
police and villagers report the “dagga for guns” trade has drastically
increased the number of firearms on the Lesotho side of the border in
recent years:
Basotho sell dagga to the South Africans in exchange for
guns and this is one of the major difficulties for us to pre-
vent stock theft. There is a lot of dagga within our country
and as more Basotho grow and sell it more and more guns
enter Lesotho and stock theft becomes worse.15
Stolen stock is also traded for guns and thus the cycle of violence on
the border continues. Given the ongoing violent conflict in some areas
of the former Transkei, the demobilisation of the Transkei military and
police forces and the armed organisations which operated and sought
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sanctuary there, it is hardly surprising that illegal firearms are easily
available. 
The people we interviewed were unable or unwilling to identify the
shadowy figures who head these networks, other than to speculate that
they are rich people because they hire others to work for them. Police
in Qacha’s Nek report that most of the thieves they arrest have been
hired.16
CAUSES OF STOCK THEFT
L
ivestock is the most visible form of wealth in the mountain
area of Lesotho. The ease with which stolen animals can be
exchanged for cash, dagga (marijuana) and guns, or simply
slaughtered and eaten, makes stock an attractive commodity.
The rugged terrain and mobility of livestock in the mountain
districts make it relatively easy to steal. 
The overriding cause of stock theft is clearly poverty. Joblessness and
poverty were consistently rated by respondents as the primary reasons
for endemic theft. Unemployment has certainly increased substantially
throughout Lesotho since 1990. Youth (particularly males) are the hard-
est hit. Unemployment rates are higher in the rural and mountain areas
of Lesotho where people are particularly dependent on livestock.
Poverty is also more severe in these areas.17 Not surprisingly, the level of
stock theft rises following poor harvests. The cycle is a depressing one –
stock theft is a result of poverty, stock theft increases poverty and
poverty begets more stock theft. 
The stock theft epidemic cannot be isolated from changing migrant
labour dynamics. Of particular concern to many is the continuing
return of retrenched miners to Lesotho who are barred from finding
other work in South Africa. Many respondents saw a link between
retrenchments and increasing stock theft. As one commented: 
It is worse since around 1990 when retrenchment became
too much. People used to make their living from the mines
but they have been sent back. Most of the miners bought
stock when they returned but it was stolen so they in turn
choose to steal.18
In 1990, 5,083 men from Qacha’s Nek district were employed on
South African mines, a figure that declined to 2,371 in 1998. Quthing
district suffered a similar drop over the same period, from 8,577 to
4,778. Male youth are also experiencing a drastic curtailment in
employment opportunities on the mines. In the past, young men from
initiation school, with little or no formal education, would typically
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 21
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have become mineworkers. However, in all of 1998 only 10 novices
were recruited from Qacha’s Nek and 38 from Quthing.19 These youth
have abysmal employment prospects in Lesotho:
I think the youth are the ones who steal our animals espe-
cially because there is an increasing rate of unemployment.
They have nothing to live on and as a result they resort to
stock theft. I suspect these people because despite the fact
that they are unemployed they still wear new clothes, they
are not poor and one wonders where they get the money.20
Retrenched miners and unemployable male youth are the foot sol-
diers of stock theft operations on the Lesotho side of the border. 
Within Lesotho, stock theft is often attributed to jealousy, where
those without stock steal from their relatively prosperous neighbours.21
Many people comment that anyone who accumulates significant num-
bers of stock is a target for poorer villagers who resent the obvious
wealth and status of the stockowner. A contributing factor is that peo-
ple who have managed to amass large herds are sometimes suspected of
having done so at least partly through theft. These suspicions highlight
the increasing gap between the small numbers of successful livestock
owners and the large majority of people in the mountains who struggle
to survive. 
The situation in the former Transkei is very similar to that of south-
ern Lesotho. It is one of the poorest regions of South Africa with a high
rate of unemployment and miner retrenchment, widespread environ-
mental degradation which negatively affects agricultural production and
livestock grazing, a poor to non-existent infrastructure, and policing and
judicial systems which have been accused of both incompetence and
active involvement in stock theft.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF STOCK RAIDING
Stock theft has affected my family in that my neighbour used
to lend me his donkeys to go and grind corn into flour and
this is a long distance. Thieves stole all his animals and
nobody will lend us their donkeys for fear that they might be
stolen. We now use wheelbarrows and it takes a very long
time. Moreover, we used to buy milk from the neighbours,
but now their animals have been stolen. In addition, last year
I has unable to plough my fields because I had to hire some-
body’s cattle, but I was late because about six households were
already ahead of me. Generally stock theft has affected us
negatively, we just wish that something could be done.22
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This village has been affected by this tragedy because when
people have nothing to eat in their houses, it means they
will go to a neighbour’s and that affects the neighbour’s
wealth when he has to share outside of his household. It
even causes a lot of crime within the village and stock theft
then even occurs within the village. Above all, I am sad to
see many children not going to school because their par-
ents have no money – that is what is happening now in
this village because of stock theft. What makes things
worse is that even those people who work on the mines
have been retrenched and this brings terrible poverty to
their families. Now crime will increase like in South
Africa.23
Statistics provided by the Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of
Livestock Services indicate a steady decline in wool and mohair produc-
tion since 1994 in both Qacha’s Nek and Quthing districts.24 While
stock theft may not be the only reason for decreasing production, it is
certainly a contributing factor. Not only has stock theft reduced the
number of animals, the day-to-day fear of having animals stolen discour-
ages stockowners from purchasing expensive breeding stock to improve
the quality of their herds.25 The quality of livestock and their products
has deteriorated, as a result
A 1997 study by the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the
United Nations (FAO) reported that an escalation in stock theft would
undermine livestock improvement programmes.26 One stockowner who
had 665 sheep and goats stolen within a one year period explains:
I was a member of the District Animal Committee and I
was also a member of the National Animal Committee. I
used good quality rams, angora goats and merino rams.
There were all taken without being sheared, I lost every-
thing in that year. I have the goats that are left, but I am
afraid to spend my money to improve their quality.27
We used to buy rams from South Africa as a cooperative in
order to improve our stock by breeding high quality ani-
mals for better wool. All these things have collapsed due to
stock theft. You cannot think of improving what is going to
be taken from you the next day.28
Livestock quality is also suffering because stockowners are reluctant
to move their animals to traditional summer grazing areas at the cattle
posts, as these areas are considered less secure. As a result, lands closer
to the villages have come under even greater stress than previously and
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are experiencing high levels of over-grazing and degradation. Only 31%
of stock owning respondents now rotate their grazing lands on a consis-
tent basis and an additional 8% do so only occasionally: “Stock theft
has affected the quality of my stock because my animals do not graze
where there is a lot of grass because I am afraid they will be stolen. Now
they are very thin.”29
Five of six border villages report that grazing patterns have been
drastically altered. As one stock owner explains, “This has reduced the
grazing area to a very small portion where all stock gather throughout
the seasons of the year.”30 Grazing animals closer to the village does not
ensure their safety and may, in fact, put the village at risk. Respondents
from one village revealed that they tried to graze their animals in a
more secure area near the village, which resulted in thieves coming to
the village with guns in order to capture the animals. The shortage of
shepherds, which has been exacerbated by stock theft, also contributes
to the reduced use of traditional grazing lands at cattle posts. 
Stock theft has had a deleterious effect on agriculture. Fewer oxen
are available for ploughing fields and the pressure on these animals has
increased. Non-stockowners complain that they must wait a long time
before animals are available for them to plough, by which time it may
be too late:
We are now unable to plough due to a lack of animals. We
need to borrow other people’s animals which we might
have to wait for until the owner has finished with his/her
own fields, hence we are always behind time and, as a
result, our crops’ quality becomes very low. We may even
have to hire some people’s animals or tractors. Sometimes
we are even forced to participate in sharecropping due to a
lack of animals to use in our fields.31
Tractors are available for some people to hire but, again, the waiting
list is long and the cost of renting is prohibitive for many. Furthermore,
tractors are only capable of reaching the lower fields and villages must
be easily accessible by a road. Tractors are simply not an option at all in
three interview villages, and all of the others had a number of fields
which tractors are unable to access. As a result many fields go unculti-
vated:
No one is ploughing at this place because we do not have
tractors, our hope was on cattle that are almost finished
because of stock theft. Many people are unable to plough,
some even use spades to plough just a little – enough to
eat. People are starving. In the high land people use cattle
to plough. That means when they are stolen, we fail to
CROSS-BORDER RAIDING AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN THE LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER ZONE
14
plough because we do not have ploughing machinery.
Farming has failed in this place.32
Department of Rural Development projects in the agricultural sector
have also been undermined due to stock theft. A farm demonstration
programme initiated in Qacha’s Nek failed due to a lack of oxen for
ploughing. The Qacha’s Nek Rural Development Office states that
although many farmers were interested in the programme, they were
unable to undertake the initiative because there was an insufficient
number of oxen.33
The economic impact of stock theft on households, villages and dis-
tricts has been devastating. Stock theft, coupled with decreasing agri-
cultural production and increasing unemployment, deepens poverty and
desperation. Nearly 90% of respondents state their household
economies have been negatively affected by stock theft. A household’s
entire wealth and livelihood can be wiped out in one attack. In such
circumstances, the possibility of economic recovery is unlikely and the
long-term economic viability of the household is threatened. For exam-
ple, one stockowner had stock valued at over M200,000 stolen in a
matter of months. He stated that whereas previously he had been the
richest person in the village, he is now one of the poorest.34
Income from the proceeds of their animals – by selling an animal or
its milk, labour, wool or mohair – pays for such extras as schooling for
their children. One respondent lost 50 goats in one night which provid-
ed his household M3,000 worth of mohair per year to pay for the school
fees of his 5 children.35 People in all 10 villages commented on their
declining ability to school their children. Numerous villagers have also
observed declining nutritional levels – especially amongst children. The
availability of meat and milk has decreased in many villages making it
much more expensive to purchase. Furthermore, many households
which were previously able to supply themselves with meat and milk are
no longer able to do so.
The price of livestock has decreased, putting additional stress on
household income-generating capabilities. There are a number of rea-
sons for this. First, stolen animals are sold at much reduced prices and
are readily available except in the most remote villages. Second, ani-
mals are of poorer quality because they are kept closer to the village
where grazing lands are inferior. Third, full-grown animals are stolen
and only immature stock remains which fetches a lower price. Finally,
the full-grown stock which remains is needed for breeding and activities
such as ploughing and therefore only immature animals can be sold. 
The increasing rate of stock theft in Lesotho’s mountain districts has
hit small businesses hard. Shop owners are now reluctant to go to the
Eastern Cape to buy supplies to replenish the goods in their stores and
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people simply do not have the money to buy their goods: 
I used to sell blocks to people and run a shop. I received
cheques for my wool and would improve my businesses
with this money, but now I am unable to do that and my
businesses are declining everyday. I can buy nothing
because I do not even have enough money to support my
family.36
THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF RAIDING
T
he loss of livestock and livelihood is one of the most visible
impacts of criminal stock raiding and theft. But escalating
stock theft and related violence have profound social 
consequences, bringing fear and insecurity to ordinary
people:
The possibility of violence related to stock theft haunts us.
We keep wondering what will happen when they have fin-
ished all the animals. We think that we will be the next
victims. We are afraid that they are going to kill us all
thinking that we have hidden some animals or that when
they are through with something, they will take away all
our belongings.37
I feel threatened because Mafengu do not just come and
steal, they also kill whomever they meet on their way. I
cannot say ‘I do not have stock’ whenever they come or
whenever we are called by the chief to follow them to
reclaim stock. I have to go. That has happened three times.
You see we are also in danger although we don’t have ani-
mals because these people with livestock help us in many
ways, so we must help them.38
We feel very threatened especially those like me – an old
one who cannot even run. If I had a daughter in a town I
would move and stay with her. This has affected me in that
I do not feel secure. I feel like this is a different place. I
have lived here for more than fifty years but it looks new
and strange to me. I wish I had died together with my hus-
band then I would not have seen these atrocities.39
A number of villages along the border in Qacha’s Nek and Quthing
have recently been abandoned as a result of the raids. In one of our 
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villages, homesteads situated higher along the mountain were abandoned
in January 1998 after two people were killed and houses looted in raids.
Fourteen families have been displaced and now rent accommodation in a
nearby village. Although soldiers are now stationed in the village. the
families are still afraid to return. People have had to abandon their
homes, their fields, their possessions, and their livelihoods. According to
the chief of this village the effects of such displacement on people are
profound: “Some people in my village have lost everything. The worse
part is that people have lost their lives because of stock theft violence.
People have left their homes and fields and now they live very miser-
able lives.”40
A related consequence has been the increase in rural-urban 
migration – especially of young people:
People have been impoverished by this problem of stock
theft. Now since they have nothing, obviously they have to
come to the town to look for piece jobs because there is
more employment in towns. So there has been an increased
influx into the towns which has then increased the crime
in town.41
The District Secretary of Qacha’s Nek highlighted the devastating
impact of stock raiding on villagers:
People have been killed in numbers – I can assure you of
that. You go around to Qanya – people have fled their
places of residence. They have left almost everything.
People have lost their lives because of stock theft. People
have been killed when thieves come into their houses
because what we have now is not stock theft but capturing.
At Mosaqane people have fled their houses right up to
where Mosaqane ends – they have come down here. And
they have come here without anything to live on. They
cause problems because they need to be accommodated. I
was asked by people from Ha Makoae if my office could
supply tents but we could not afford that because we don’t
have anything. Many people there have nothing.42
Stock theft has affected relations within villages on a number of differ-
ent levels. Many of our respondents accuse chiefs of aiding and abetting
stock theft. Chiefs allegedly participate in stock theft in several different
ways; turning a blind eye to stolen animals in their villages, protecting
thieves, and providing false documentation for stolen stock. Some vil-
lages are reputed to be havens for stock thieves, places where they can
hide animals before moving them in return for supplying the chief with
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an animal or two.43 Chiefs are also accused of protecting thieves who
operate from their villages:
Some chiefs try by all means to prevent stock theft but 
others are either thieves themselves or they work hand-in-
hand with the thieves. For example when we were at the
village called M the chief of that village kept us waiting for
many hours before he granted us permission to look for our
animals within his village. We learned later that he had
sent his representative to tell the thieves to hide the stolen
animals.44
The practice of issuing receipts for stolen animals contributes to con-
flict when the animals are sold, particularly if they are claimed at a later
date by their legitimate owners who produce the original documents.45
The level of mistrust amongst villagers has also reportedly increased:
Our village is very much affected. People do not trust each
other and that causes conflicts. We are afraid of quarrelling
because the person you quarrel with might come and steal
from your kraal that night.46
Relations are not good within this village. When stock is
stolen people do not greet each other because they always
suspect one another.47
Non-stockowners feel that they are often unjustly suspected of being
thieves and fear they may be injured or killed as a result of such suspi-
cions. Nearly half of all stockowners interviewed suspect specific 
individuals within their village are responsible for the theft of animals –
acting either as informants or actual thieves:
Relations are not good because there are people in our vil-
lage who allow thieves to stay in their homes and our stock
is stolen. We have one person in our village who provides
thieves with information. When stock goes missing from
the village you see him with new clothes.48
Relations are not good amongst the people of this village.
We even point to our neighbours saying because they have
visited Matatiele that is why our stock is being stolen. We
suspect they give information about our kraals. There is no
trust among the villagers.49
Stockowners and non-stockowners alike comment on the falling lev-
els of cooperation. Non-stockowning villagers rely on the communal
goodwill of stockowners to share the benefits of animals, but as the rate
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of stock theft has increased and the total number of animals in villages
has decreased, such cooperation is diminishing. Poorer people are no
longer permitted to enter the kraals to collect cow dung:
Poor people don’t have cow dung. They have to ask from
those that have animals. But now because of the conflict in
the village they must follow the animals. They can no
longer collect dung from the kraals. The owners of the ani-
mals refuse, they tell them, ‘You are the thieves and we
cannot help you with anything’.50
In remote villages donkeys and horses are not as readily lent for
transportation to those who do not have animals. The vast majority of
those who do not own draught animals report they are either unable to
plough or that their fields are ploughed too late to produce a sufficient
harvest. Stockowners agree:
Since we are neighbours sometimes we help them plough
without asking for money. But this is becoming too much
on our side since so many people in the village have lost
stock. In the past before their stock was stolen we used to
join hands when ploughing. But if I am the only one doing
that work, my bulls will become tired and thin. And even
myself, I will not be patient enough to help all of them.51
Stock theft also exacerbates intra-household divisions. The issue of
whether or not to sell animals which have not been stolen is fiercely
contested – primarily along gender divides, but also generationally.
According to one stockowner, ‘Stock theft is one of the most common
issues discussed within families today.’52 Women generally want to sell
stock to secure scarce resources and invest in the basic needs of their
families, rather than “keep them for thieves” and invite possible injury
or death:
Family relationships have really been affected by stock
theft. I, as a mother, will suggest that we sell all of the ani-
mals but my husband refuses. We had a lot of disputes,
especially last year when Mafengu were attacking more fre-
quently. But since they have stopped coming I have
become convinced that it may not be necessary to sell all
of them. But I can tell you ntate, many families have under-
gone serious conflicts due to stock theft.53
There have been many disagreements within my family
concerning the animals. This year my wife wanted me to
sell some sheep to pay school fees for our daughters, but I
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refused because we have very few sheep and if we sell them
we will be left with nothing to live on.54
I quarrel with my wife who encourages me to sell the
remaining animals before they are stolen. She says there is
no need to starve instead of selling stock that will be taken
by thieves.55
Children also encourage their parents to sell their animals and to put
the money in a bank or invest it in their education. While in many
cases this is prompted by the fear of stock theft and the physical and
economic danger in which this places the family, sometimes children
are simply uninterested in rearing animals or in acting as shepherds.
Not all women want to sell their household’s stock. In a few cases –
most often when the spouse is a migrant worker – women state they
cannot live without animals and must convince their husbands not to
sell their stock.56 Donkeys carry their heavy loads, cattle plough their
fields and provide their children with meat and milk. 
There is a widely-held sentiment that a Mosotho is not a Mosotho
without animals. Virtually all cultural practices require animals.
However, in every interview village stock theft has drastically reduced
livestock holdings. This makes it very difficult for people to contribute
to cultural events. Traditional practices are being eroded as a result and
may eventually be abandoned:
I have a son who can marry at any time from now, but I am
worried that I will not be able to pay bohali for his wife.
Most of the cultural events which require animals to be
slaughtered have diminished. We have lost a lot of our
identity as Basotho because of the lack of animals due to
stock theft.57
Births and deaths still require the slaughtering of animals and the
inability to do so is regarded as a disgrace: “We can ignore some cere-
monies, but the funeral we cannot ignore, our gods will be angry with
us.”58
Mistrust has also contributed to the decline of mafisa. This is a long-
standing practice whereby a stockowner gives animals to a friend or rel-
ative to care for. In return, they keep a portion of the proceeds of the
animal (milk or wool) and often the offspring. Today, Basotho feel more
comfortable keeping their animals closer to home and believe they will
be more vigilant in preventing theft. Furthermore, when mafisa animals
are stolen, there is inevitably suspicion that the recipients played a part
in the theft.
More than 80% of respondents think that domestic drudgery has
CROSS-BORDER RAIDING AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT IN THE LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER ZONE
20
increased as a result of stock theft. This is primarily due to the lack of
dung within villages. Many Basotho in rural areas use dung to smear the
floors of their homes and for cooking; however, now women must use
wood for fires. Deforestation in many of the interview villages is evident
and many women now spend anywhere from 3 to 6 hours per day col-
lecting wood in addition to their other duties. 
Previously men may have used oxen to transport large sections of
trees, but the lack of draught animals in villages means women must
carry the wood themselves. Unless the rate of stock theft is brought
under control, women will have to travel longer distances searching for
wood which they say increases the risk of sexual harassment.
Furthermore, if collecting wood takes women outside their village
boundaries it causes conflict between villages over scarce resources.59 In
villages where wood is simply unavailable, households may be forced to
spend scarce financial resources on paraffin for cooking and heating.
THE DECLINE OF CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION
B
oth sides of the Lesotho/Eastern Cape border region are
under-resourced and under-developed – a situation which has
contributed to the tension. With such high levels of hatred
and mistrust, it is impossible to envision successful coopera-
tive activities of any sort, since people simply refuse to work
with one another. This is clearly exemplified by the fact that the
Qacha’s Nek District Liaison Committee (DLC), a body made up of
local leaders on both sides of the border, whose purpose is to encourage
cross border cooperation and defuse potential conflicts, has not met
since December 1997. There are no indications it will be resurrected.60
Cross border activities, which previously were part of everyday life in
this region of Lesotho have been drastically reduced and/or altered:
We were cooperating with other associations in South
Africa but since October 1996 when they started to attack
us in our village we stopped working together. We were
going to South Africa and they were coming to our country
but since 1996 everything has stopped.61
Prior to 1994, Basotho were able to graze their animals along the
Eastern Cape side of the border where grazing lands are superior to their
own. This is no longer an option. Children living in border villages
sometimes attended schools in the Eastern Cape, but parents feel it is
no longer safe for them to do so. Women report that they can no longer
collect wood near the border, where the wood supply is more plentiful,
as they are in danger of assault and sexual harassment. Many respondents
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state they are afraid to go to border towns to buy provisions due to anti-
Basotho sentiment. Even Basotho shop owners are no longer able to
shop at wholesalers in Matatiele. 
Suspicion, mistrust and lack of cooperation now define most cross-
border inter-village relations. As one stockowner observed, “Each vil-
lage thinks that the other villages steal or help South African steal their
cattle.”62 Such suspicion often results in violence: “We do not have
good relations with people across the Senqu (River) because of stock
theft. We know they steal our stock and if we go to their places they
will kill us.”63
People are no longer able to visit other villages freely. Any unknown
person is regarded with suspicion. Respondents in one village recounted
an incident in which men confronted strangers approaching the village
with the result that two of the villagers were shot. While this is an
extreme case, general mistrust prevails:
There is no peace. I might take a journey from here to Ha
Rapase or any other place. When I get there, people will
no longer welcome me as they used to before because they
suspect I might be a thief.64
Strangers at our village have to report their presence to the
chief even before they go to the people whom they are vis-
iting. When strangers spend a night or more our husbands
patrol the village at night until the strangers are gone.65
The conflict exacerbates ethnic/nationalist tension and Mafengu are
stigmatised as violent thugs: 
Guns in South Africa are just like pens to pupils. Every
pupil when going to school is expected to have a pen. In
South Africa every dirty street boy has a firearm. What do
you expect from such a person?66
The border situation is fueling dangerously high levels of ethnic ten-
sion and nationalism. The enmity Basotho in border villages feel for
South Africans is evident:
The people in Matatiele hate us, but we hate them more.
We wish that they could all be dead. They have done a ter-
rible thing to us and we are now poor because of them. I
hate them really.67
By far the most common community effort to thwart stock theft has
been the formation of stock theft associations (STA). Six of the ten 
villages in which we interviewed had active STAs, three others had
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operated STAs in the past but had abandoned them for a variety of rea-
sons. The primary task of these associations is to search for animals that
have been stolen and to apprehend and turn thieves over to the police.
Meetings to discuss methods of reducing stock theft are also held and,
in some instances, members patrol the village at night to guard against
theft. Membership dues are used to buy provisions for reclamation expe-
ditions and to hire lawyers when members are accused of torturing and
killing suspects. 
In villages that lack a formal association, friends and neighbours will
usually come together to search for stolen animals. 
Communal efforts to recover animals, and in some cases to prevent
theft, are generally more successful than individual initiatives. When
STAs from neighbouring villages cooperate, the chances of recovering
stolen animals increases. However, only 30% of respondents indicate
that there are cooperative activities with neighbouring villages – either
in Lesotho or South Africa – to prevent or reduce stock theft or search
for stolen animals. Some cross-border efforts have yielded good results:
“Boers of Underburg work together with us for instance when we find
their stolen stock in Lesotho we return it to them. They do the same for
us. Sometimes we work together to recover stolen stock.”68  There is also
a cross border project operating in the Mphaki area which both resi-
dents and local police say has reduced the incidence of theft and vio-
lence. Other initiatives both in Quthing and Qacha’s Nek have been
less successful:
We have formed a liaison committee and have started
working together as chiefs and farmers of Matatiele and
Lesotho. Very few Basotho have recovered their animals
but South Africans have recovered all of their missing ani-
mals. That is what makes Basotho reluctant to accept this
cooperation. The problem with South Africans is that they
do not respect the law, they do what they like even in the
presence of the police. They refuse to release stolen ani-
mals no matter what the police say or do.69
While they offer the best chance for recovering stolen animals,
STAs are not without their drawbacks. Associations are plagued by the
same squabbles that divide villages; political rivalries and mistrust
brought about by stock theft often hamper cooperative efforts. STAs
disband because thieves join the organisations to render them ineffec-
tive. The mismanagement of funds and the fact that some members
attempt to keep recovered animals stolen from other villages also lead
to the dissolution of STAs. 
Clashes with police cause some associations to cease operating. In
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such cases respondents are adamant that the police are in league with
the thieves:70
We were encouraged to form a stock theft association by a
police commander by the name of M. He was here some
five years ago. He taught us how to run the association and
worked with us but since he left the remaining police com-
mander is just not interested in preventing stock theft. We
were very successful in this work despite the problems that
we encountered with the police who did not like us saying
that we were taking away their work. But now that they
have destroyed us they are sleeping – theirs is just to get up
in the morning, go to the shebeen and collect their
cheques at the end of the month.71
STAs often come into conflict with thieves when they try to recover
animals and a number of people have been killed in such battles. Given
the increased availability of firearms it is inevitable that these casualties
will escalate. A further problem occurs when stock theft associations
apprehend suspected thieves. In one instance a man was beaten so badly
en route to a police station that the police supposedly refused to take
him into custody because they were afraid he would die and they would
be blamed.72 Brutal beatings are routine and some suspects are killed.
Most cases of this nature are probably never reported. 
Villages in Lesotho cooperate with neighbouring South African
communities/organisations to reduce cross-border theft are at some risk,
particularly if they confiscate stolen South African animals from
Basotho thieves. In one area in Qacha’s Nek, these actions precipitated
an intense conflict between communities within Lesotho, resulting in
several deaths as the thieves from the interior sought revenge on the
border village which interfered with their activities. A similar situation
prevails in Quthing:
There are some villages along the border which tend to be
victimised more than villages further in the country. And
having noticed that they try to intercept stolen animals
coming into the country so they won’t be victimised by
South African thieves. Now they become even more vic-
timised as a result of doing that because those thieves will
run away and leave the animals but come back in the night
and steal all the animals of the villagers where they were
intercepted. This is their revenge.73
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POLICING THE CRISIS
T
he seeming inability of police, prosecutors and magistrates
to apprehend and convict thieves enflames an already
volatile situation. For instance, in 1998 of the 359 cases of
stock theft reported to the police in Quthing district, there
were 7 arrests and 4 convictions. In 1994, despite a total of
255 cases of stock theft being reported not a single person in either
Qacha’s Nek or Quthing was convicted. In all of 1994 and 1995 no one
was arrested for stock theft in Quthing.74 These figures are even more
alarming when one considers that a large proportion of stock theft cases
are not reported to the police. The District Secretary of Qacha’s Nek
traces the onset of widespread cross-border theft in Lesotho to South
African dissatisfaction with the difficulties in recovering their stolen ani-
mals once stock was impounded or the subject of court cases in Lesotho.
Partly this speaks to the difficulty of policing effectively across inter-
national borders. But some accuse the police and justice officials of
complicity in the vicious cycle of raiding that characterises cross border
theft between Lesotho and South Africa:
The police are the main source of all this mess because
whenever they recovered animals stolen from Matatiele,
they did not take them back to Matatiele, instead they kept
them and after some months they auction them to them-
selves. This made Mafengu want to pay revenge saying that
Basotho eat all their animals. That is the reason why these
people decided to attack Basotho and capture their livestock.75
One government official alleged that high level police officers from
the lowlands are involved in transporting stock and that one in particu-
lar owns hundreds of stolen animals. There are rumours that elements
within the Eastern Cape police also orchestrate stock theft operations.
Lesotho’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has received reports that some cor-
rupt police in the Eastern Cape own butcheries and are involved in reg-
istering and transporting stolen animals.76 These are allegations, no
more, but they surely bear investigation.
The primary reason that vigilante activities are so prevalent is the
perception that policing and the courts are ineffective. The majority of
respondents (70%) say they reported the theft of their animals to the
police. They did so not because they expected any immediate action but
because the police would then have a record of their stock to check
against any animals recovered in the future. Only 3% of respondents
who reported theft to the police recovered some or all of their stock as a
direct result of police assistance (compared to a recovery rate of 9% by
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owners with the assistance of friends, relatives and STAs).
Allegation that the police work in concert with thieves was a com-
mon thread throughout our interviews. Major Mofolo of the Lesotho
police claims they are working hard to weed out such elements: “It is
true that we have had some police corrupted by those thieves and we
have stood firmly against that – opening dockets and sending them to
court even before the ordinary cases. We try to root it out as much as
possible from the police.”77
The credibility of the Lesotho police is further undermined by their
inability to deal with South Africa raiders. Villagers on the border state
the police provide no protection out of fear.78 One border resident related
how, following an attack on his cattle post in which the raiders shot the
dogs and chased away his shepherd, the police were alerted and pursued
the thieves but abandoned their pursuit when shots were directed at
them.79 Major Mofolo said that the issue of pursuit across the border has
been discussed with the SAPS but his officers are outgunned: “We have
talked about it but we don’t have the guns to go there – those guys are
more heavily armed than us. It would cause a lot of deaths on our side.”80
Basotho are no more enamoured of police in the Eastern Cape who
they believe conspire with South African stock thieves against them.
They complain that even when Basotho trace their animals to a certain
village in South Africa, the South African police refuse to help them
recover their stock. At a meeting of the Bushman’s Nek (South Africa)/
Sehlabathebe (Lesotho) Stock Theft Liaison Committee it was noted: 
Farmers in Sehlabathebe are not getting any cooperation
from the Maluti Stock Theft Unit in Eastern Cape when
they had information that their stolen stock was in that
area. The Lesotho Delegation complains that cases do not
get attended. Complainants get attacked if they go on their
own after stolen stock. Some have actually been killed in
the past but no investigation was done.81
Basotho on the border are very bitter that neither the Lesotho nor
South African police provide effective assistance. Moreover, Basotho
who go to South Africa to retrieve their animals do so at great risk.
My animals were stolen and taken to Matatiele according
to the information I got. We went there but didn’t get any
help from the Matatiele police. We came back empty
handed even though we saw the place our animals were
taken. The people of that village warned us not to enter.82
We went with a police sergeant (from Lesotho) but when
we arrived at the police station in Matatiele, our two police
officers were disarmed. We went to that village that we sus-
pected and when we arrived there one man told us that our
cattle passed through on Saturday and the thieves slaugh-
tered four of them. The meat was shared among the people
of that village. We searched that village with the police. A
man called out asking whether we were from Lesotho and
then they told us to come closer so they could kill us. We
found 14 of our cattle and started to drive them back. The
people of that village said we should be killed but the police
separated us. The villagers put stones in the road to prevent
us from passing but we managed to get past them (without
the cattle). One of those men was holding an AK-47.83
In defence of the Lesotho police, it should be noted that they face
enormous difficulties in their campaign to bring stock theft under con-
trol and are understandably frustrated with public perceptions that they
are incompetent and dishonest. The rugged terrain and lack of access
roads render the mountain areas a thieves’ paradise. Cross-border ten-
sions impede their ability to deal with cross-border theft. The police
have neither the human nor material resources to effectively combat
stock theft. In all of Qacha’s Nek and Quthing there are only eight
police posts separated by long distances. Qacha’s Nek has 16 officers in
the stock theft unit, while Quthing has 14. Only the main stations at
Qacha’s Nek and Quthing have vehicles, the other posts are supplied
with horses. There are no larger vehicles capable of transporting recov-
ered stolen stock.
With the paltry resources currently available to them, the police
simply cannot be expected to control stock theft. The wish list of the
police is a long one: more officers so that satellite posts can be estab-
lished in remote areas, 4x4 vehicles for all posts, vehicles for transport-
ing stock, radio links with villages for faster reporting, incentives for
stock theft unit officers who work under difficult conditions and, espe-
cially, a helicopter.84
It is impossible for the police to respond to every case of stock theft. It
most cases it is futile for them to visit the site of the theft as the thieves
are long gone. The nearest police post can be as much as a two day ride
from the more remote areas. Furthermore, if animals are stolen from the
cattle posts, the theft is usually reported to the village, and only then is it
relayed to the police. Police state that they can hardly be expected to
recover animals when the theft is only reported to them several days after
its occurrence, but they understand the reasons for such delays.85 In such
instances the police open a docket and circulate a description of the
stolen animals to neighbouring police posts. If a complainant is able to
provide the police with concrete information, “we ride to the suspect and
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arrest him, but this will also depend on how busy we are.”86
Otherwise, the police mount periodic raids on villages they suspect of
harbouring stolen animals. Any animals which cannot be accounted for
are driven back to the police post and impounded. Owing to the lack of
suitable vehicles to transport the animals, time is wasted driving the ani-
mals back to the station.87 Unfortunately, many impounded animals die
from starvation or disease before the legitimate owners can be traced.88
The police report that they are received with hostility in some 
villages when they attempt to examine stock for evidence of stolen ani-
mals.89 In some cases the police meet with overt resistance especially
when they are cooperating with the SAPS to retrieve animals stolen
from South Africa. During our research, a series of raids was staged in
Qacha’s Nek involving large numbers of officers from both the Lesotho
police – including officers from Mohale’s Hoek and Quthing – and the
SAPS. In two villages, the people allowed their animals to be assembled
but protested when South African citizens were brought in to examine
the stock. Despite the presence of more than thirty police officers in
both cases, the villagers refused to submit to their animals being exam-
ined by “Mafengu” and drove all the stock from the village.90
Even taking the severe constraints facing the police into considera-
tion, the low arrest and conviction record of police and judicial authori-
ties requires explanation. Respondents claim that corrupt and incompe-
tent courts exacerbate the stock theft epidemic. The police voice their
own frustration with prosecutors and magistrates who they say often
release animals to the accused for safekeeping until the trial date with
the result that neither the suspect nor the animals are seen again.91 One
police official provided us with a copy of a letter of complaint written
by the Director General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria which
states that the prosecutor in the Qacha’s Nek court released stock to the
accused for safekeeping:
Both the accused apparently, were out on bail at that stage.
The stock in question were branded CCX18, and this is a
clear indication that the stock were from the Eastern Cape,
as it is known that Eastern Cape stock owners in the
Maluti area brand their stock with a CCX 18 brand. It is
my opinion that the prosecutor acted completely outside
his jurisdiction as the court should have decided about the
outcome of the stock after the evidence was heard. At no
stage did the prosecutor contact the investigating officer or
complainant to inform them of his decision.92
Such cases not only highlight the problems of the courts, they fur-
ther inflame cross border tensions. 
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Delays in bringing stock theft cases to trial further impede the efforts
of police: “It is difficult to get convictions. Witnesses fail to come to
court if their animals have died (while impounded) or if it takes a long
time.”93 The District Secretary of Qacha’s Nek states, “Sometimes stock
theft cases are pending for years. If cases were prosecuted quickly that
would help.”94 The recent appointment of a special stock theft prosecu-
tor has greatly improved matters in Quthing:
Since sometime last year we have had a prosecutor assigned
specifically to deal with stock theft cases. He was a police-
man. Other prosecutors who were not police didn’t seem to
show any keenness towards this particular type of case. But
this guy because he has been a police officer, he appreciates
the problems we are faced with and gives priority to stock
theft cases.95
South Africans feel that the courts in Lesotho almost invariably
favour Basotho. On the other hand, Basotho stockowners bitterly com-
plain that it is almost impossible for them to recover animals once they
have been driven across the border into South Africa. According to the
District Secretary, in 1994 South Africans captured all the stock grazing
along the border, because many Basotho grazed their stock in South
Africa. The South Africans drove all the stock to Matatiele and no one
could negotiate with them.96 Basotho then embarked on a series of
revenge raids and the situation deteriorated to its present state.
Official inaction has created a high level of anxiety, accompanied by
a degree of fatalism. Individual stockowners feel that there are no effec-
tive measures they can take to safeguard their animals – especially
against armed attacks: “How can you guard your kraal with molamu
(stick) against a gunman?”97 Even non-violent theft is extremely diffi-
cult to prevent. Stockowners spend money on fences only to have them
cut. One man built a sheep shed but thieves carted away the corrugated
iron sheets along with his sheep.98
Very few individuals admit to gun ownership and only one stock-
owner states his shepherds carry guns. The vast majority of people speak
passionately about their desire for guns believing that owning a gun is
the best way to protect themselves, their families and their stock. At a
workshop to discuss the Draft Stock Theft Bill held in Maseru in
February 1999, many people objected when the police voiced their
intention to crack down on illegal gun possession (especially automatic
weapons) and arrest offenders. Stockowners attending the workshop
complained vociferously that they need such weapons to defend them-
selves against thieves and if deprived of them they would be helpless.
The only effective deterrent to date appears to be the army. Soldiers
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posted along the border, and in some instances, in border villages, play a
key role in protecting Basotho from cross-border attacks. In one village
in Qacha’s Nek where soldiers are billeted, residents report that theft
has been considerably reduced and there have been no attacks by South
Africans since the soldiers killed several raiders. 
The presence of soldiers at Sekhalabateng in Qacha’s Nek was
applauded by nearby villagers who claimed that this has been the only
effective measure against cross border raids. Along the border in
Quthing District, soldiers are often better situated to assist villagers
because of the proximity of their bases to cattle posts. Soldiers in
Quthing have also engaged in firefights with, and killed, South
Africans.99 The soldiers’ presence in villages evidently deters South
African raids but in at least one instance, it reportedly encouraged vil-
lagers to cross the border to engage in raids of their own knowing the
soldiers would protect them from revenge attacks. Both police and gov-
ernment officials claim thieves take advantage of the soldiers’ presence
to steal with impunity and that at least some of the South Africans
killed by the military were coming to reclaim stolen stock.
THE POLITICS OF STOCK THEFT
T
here has been little cooperation between the South African
and Lesotho governments to address cross-border crime and
conflict; perhaps because the former Transkei and the
mountain districts of Lesotho are so far removed from the
centres of power in both countries. The lack of meaningful
joint initiatives between the two governments to deal with the crisis
has allowed a culture of nationalist/ethnic intolerance to develop and
ensures the violence has continued virtually unchecked.
Political turmoil and conflict within Lesotho also make constructive
approaches to the crisis difficult to envision, let alone implement. In
the affected areas, there is profound disillusionment with the political
process in Lesotho. Some feel that cross-border theft has become much
worse since 1994 when the African National Congress (ANC) was
voted into office.100 The ghost of past political conflicts is also seen to be
contributing to the current crisis. Disaffected elements of the Lesotho
Liberation Army (LLA), which operated in the former Transkei, are
supposedly deeply involved in criminal activities in the region.101
Although there is cross-border cooperation between some communi-
ties, without central government assistance it is difficult to sustain such
initiatives. “The liaison committee comprised of Basotho farmers and
South African farmers does not have the ability to prevent stock theft
because it does not have a clear policy from the two governments. The
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governments have failed to come together with a clear strategy to deal
with this problem successfully.102
The District Secretary at Qacha’s Nek reported that attempts are
being made to arrange meetings with the South African High
Commission to resolve the problem. Pinkerton Mjakeliso, First
Secretary to the South African High Commission, stated that the 
border conflict is driven by poverty but that tension along the border
makes it very difficult to initiate the regional development projects 
necessary to alleviate poverty.103 Mokhali Lithebe of Lesotho’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs claims border conflict is primarily a police matter.
Furthermore, the efforts made by his ministry to build local government
ties and cooperation have not been effective because they are constant-
ly undermined by criminals. 
The Lesotho police and the Department of Agriculture have put
together a draft Stock Theft Bill. The focus of this bill is on harsher
penalties for offenders, especially violent offenders (10 year minimum
sentence for first offence), the establishment of a national system of
marking and registration for all stock, a flurry of new regulations gov-
erning the sale and transportation of stock, and granting police
increased powers of search and seizure. 
People are divided on the potential effectiveness of the bill, although
all favour increased penalties. Doubts are expressed about the value of
marking and registration because many animals are slaughtered shortly
after being stolen. They frequently mention that corruption will render
these new measures ineffectual. Police are very positive about the pro-
posed bill as they feel the new penalties will serve as a deterrent and
because a compulsory marking scheme will allow them to more easily
establish ownership of animals. 
There are a few obvious problems with the bill. The effectiveness of
the proposed regulations are contingent on the enforcement capabilities
of the police force. If the police cannot arrest offenders, and the courts
cannot convict them, harsh new penalties are meaningless.
Furthermore, the estimated cost of implementing the ambitious live-
stock registration and marking programme mooted by the Ministry of
Agriculture is M2,512,950 – money the Ministry simply does not 
have.104
Finally, very few people in the mountain areas have heard of the pro-
posed bill – only two of ten chiefs we interviewed, for example. Even
they only knew of its existence. If the bill is passed there is a need for
an extensive campaign to inform and educate villagers with regards to
the contents of the bill and how it may affect them. Clearly, the passage
of the bill should be a government priority.
Perhaps the potential for an escalation in the current crisis is best
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illustrated by drawing parallels between the existing situation in
Lesotho’s southern regions and the violence that has plagued the Tsolo
area of the Eastern Cape for the past several years. Since the early
1990s, several hundred people have been killed in Tsolo. In 1995, 
following the deaths of more than two hundred people in a two year
period, the Kroon Commission declared that, “The situation which has
developed may be equated with a regional disaster.”105 The killings have
continued unabated since that time. The Kroon Commission found that
“the dominant and overriding underlying cause giving rise to the exten-
sive incidence of violence which plagued the Tsolo area over the period
in question was the rifeness of the stock theft in the area.”106
Both the Kroon Commission and subsequent follow up reports by
the South African Human Rights Committee (SAHRC) stress the role
of inadequate policing in initiating and sustaining the violence:
Much of the disenchantment of the community with the
police is born of the inability of the Tsolo police to deal
effectively with the endemic problem of stock theft in the
Tsolo area which has led sections of the community to take
the law into their own hands and mete out their own pun-
ishment to suspected stock thieves and it is probable that
there have been some revenge killings as well. A contribu-
tory factor is the inability of the police to deal effectively
with the widespread incidence of violence.107
Of 801 stock theft cases reported to the police in Tsolo between
January 1993 and May 1995, only 8 convictions were gained.108
The SAHRC, which investigated the situation through to the end of
1997, noted that retrenched miners were deeply implicated in the vio-
lence. Opposing factions organised themselves into the Umfelandawonye
wa Bafuyi, a self-professed anti-stock association and a group known as
the Amampondomise Thieves Unit. The conflict intensified and spread
to neighbouring Qumbu throughout 1996 and 1997.109 The SAHRC
also said that while stock theft was the central cause of the violence,
other factors such as gunrunning and political rivalries contributed to
the crisis.
The situation in the southern Lesotho border zone has not yet dete-
riorated to the level in Tsolo and Qumbu, but the parallels are ominous.
Both areas are economically underdeveloped and suffer the effects of the
contraction of the South African mining industry; both are inadequately
policed and poorly served by their judicial systems; both are plagued by
vigilantism; both have experienced a cycle of violence ignited and dri-
ven by stock theft; and both areas have been flooded with weapons.
The presence of the international boundary introduces additional
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complications to the Lesotho/Eastern Cape border region. Any attempt-
ed solutions will require the cooperation of both national governments
along with the affected provincial and district administrations. The
close proximity of two different militaries, and the existence of
ethnic/nationalist tensions, figure prominently in this regard and
increase the prospects of an international dispute. Furthermore, the 
current political deadlock in Lesotho has created a climate whereby
political parties and criminal syndicates can exploit social divisions.110
The national government, like its predecessors, has largely ignored the
remote mountain areas hardest hit by stock theft. Unless action is taken
to address the crisis there is a strong possibility that a Tsolo-like disaster
situation will develop. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A
large majority of our respondents feel the situation will
only improve if the unemployment rate declines. To this
end, they suggest the government must create jobs.
Despite general disenchantment with the police, many
villagers want more police; specifically, they want police
posts established in remote villages. They also think it is necessary for
the police to receive better training and to be remunerated more gener-
ously so they will not be so easily corrupted. 
The frustration and anger of residents is evident in their desire for
stock thieves to receive harsher punishments, including the death
penalty.111 Many feel that the military should play an increased role in
the fight against stock theft. Villagers stationed close to army camps feel
safer and state they have been victimised less since the soldiers’ arrival.
Accordingly, residents suggest the number of soldiers should be
increased and that camps should be established at all the border passes.
As butcheries are consistently implicated in encouraging theft by
knowingly purchasing stolen animals, the regulation and inspection of
butcheries by police and government officials is widely advocated. Some
villagers think that chiefs should be monitored by the government and
if it is found that a chief encourages or does not discourage theft he or
she should be demoted.
While it is clear that the only long-term solution is a reduction in
poverty, macro-economic policies are beyond the scope of this paper’s
recommendations. Our suggestions focus on immediate measures
designed to improve the situation:
• Both the Lesotho and South African governments should
acknowledge that a crisis situation exists and that this is a
regional problem. Only when national governments, working
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with local stakeholders, take the problem seriously and begin
cooperating can workable initiatives be implemented.
• Special attention should be paid to Qacha’s Nek where cross
border relations are particularly hostile and where the District
Liaison Committee has not functioned since 1997.
• The Lesotho Draft Stock Theft Bill has much to recommend it,
but for it to be effective several things must happen: 1) the pow-
ers that be must rise above political infighting and pass the Bill
into law; 2) the police must be provided with the necessary sup-
port to enable them to enforce new legislation; 3) funds must be
made available to implement the national registration and
marking programme – including an information and education
program.
The following are the minimum requirements necessary for the
police to effectively combat stock theft:
• Special stock theft prosecution units should be established with
trained and motivated staff in each district with the goal of
expediting stock theft prosecutions. The possibility of mobile
prosecution teams that travel to a few centers within each dis-
trict should be explored.
• In recognition of the fact that stock theft is the foremost crime
in the mountain areas, stock theft units should be allocated
more officers.
• The total number of police should be bolstered in order for
satellite stations to be established in more remote areas.
• Each police station accessible by road should have at least one
4x4 vehicle, and each district headquarters should have vehicles
capable of transporting stock.
• Police state a helicopter, even one shared between the mountain
districts, would be a great asset in the fight against stock theft.
A clear blueprint outlining exactly how a helicopter would be
utilised would help assess whether the benefits justify the expen-
diture. The possibility of police/military cooperation with regard
to the use of a helicopter in stock theft operations should be
explored. 
• Radio contacts with remote villages should be established to
facilitate the reporting of stock theft and other crimes. Officers
on patrol, whether on horseback or in vehicles, should be pro-
vided with portable two-way radios to enable them to maintain
contact with the station and fellow officers.
• A special effort should be made to uncover and prosecute police
and military personnel involved in stock theft.
• The police should mount a public relations campaign through-
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out the districts to improve their image. As it stands, people
have little confidence in the police. A special effort should be
made to assure people the police will do everything in their
power to reduce stock theft (and all other crimes). At present,
the police are seen as non-responsive when crimes are reported.
This perception results in the under reporting of crimes and
encourages vigilantism. The police should consult with villagers
and listen to their complaints and suggestions. People need to
understand the constraints that the police operate under and
efforts should be made to establish closer links between police
and communities. 
• Crimes of violence should be more carefully categorised to ascer-
tain whether or not there is a connection to stock theft. At the
present time many murders, assaults and possibly even rape
occur during stock raids. When the connection is more clearly
established the seriousness of the stock theft and violence crisis
will be more difficult for the government to ignore.
• Integrated units composed of SANDF and LDF personnel should
be established and stationed along the border to reduce inci-
dents of cross border raiding.
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Livestock Ownership*
Stockowner No.** Cattle Sheep Goats Horses Donkeys
1 3 0 8 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 1
3 4 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0 1
5 7 0 10 0 0
6 2 0 0 0 0
7 5 0 2 1 3
8 3 8 2 0 1
9 2 0 0 0 1
10 15 30 8 1 0
11 2 0 10 0 0
12 0 0 42 0 3
13 5 0 0 0 1
14 0 0 0 0 1
15 0 0 0 0 2
16 3 10 0 1 1
17 7 6 0 2 0
18 1 0 3 2 0
19 7 20 17 2 1
20 4 6 1 0 2
21 2 5 2 1 0
22 0 2 0 0 0
23 15 20 25 1 0
24 8 3 4 1 0
25 4 40 15 1 0
26 0 4 0 0 0
27 2 18 0 1 0
28 2 4 1 1 0
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29 3 0 0 0 0
30 2 20 15 1 2
31 2 2 0 0 0
32 2 3 3 0 0
33 1 2 0 0 0
34 4 0 0 0 2
35 2 0 6 0 4
36 3 0 10 0 0
37 7 0 18 0 3
38 3 9 7 0 2
39 5 4 45 0 2
40 9 0 0 0 4
41 9 0 51 0 0
42 5 4 0 0 0
43 20 70 31 6 0
44 16 10 17 1 2
45 4 0 0 0 1
46 1 12 13 0 1
47 5 3 9 0 0
48 4 40 12 1 1
49 15 0 86 2 0
50 1 32 0 0 0
51 11 200 1 3 0
52 4 47 20 0 0
53 7 0 0 2 1
54 21 251 4 18 4
55 4 0 0 0 1
56 13 100 78 4 0
57 15 95 5 2 1
58 5 0 0 6 0
59 7 20 0 0 0
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60 1 10 15 1 0
61 0 10 20 0 0
62 0 8 0 0 0
63 4 3 12 1 2
64 3 10 0 1 0
65 4 4 6 0 0
66 15 13 20 1 2
67 4 5 5 2 2
68 4 11 4 2 2
69 2 2 0 1 0
70 5 0 0 0 0
71 2 0 0 0 1
72 2 0 0 0 0
73 12 24 5 0 4
74 5 5 24 1 0
75 6 36 9 2 0
76 6 3 0 2 2
77 10 62 0 2 0
78 2 20 0 1 1
79 5 60 9 1 7
80 10 110 10 1 1
81 8 52 12 1 1
82 17 200 40 3 3
83 9 100 30 2 1
84 4 35 2 0 1
85 15 172 18 2 4
86 2 0 0 0 0
Total no. 474 2055 821 89 54
animals owned
No. respondents 80 58 53 44 44
who own
* Number of animals owned. ** 1 case missing.
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